Releasing the Potential of Nursing Labour by Pye, Michael
RELEASING THE POTENTIAL 
OF NURSING LABOUR 
MichaeiPye 
The University ofWaikato 
Abstract 
The recent release of the "Report of the Ministerial Taskforce on Nursing: Releasing the Potential of Nursing" 
provides a useful point of reference to analyse again the changing division of labour in the production of 
health and sickness services in New Zealand following a period of significant reform. Sociological inquiry 
into the relationships between the various occupational groups engaged in the provision of health services 
has, in the past, tended to focus on the professionalising projects of the respective occupations, and on the 
contestation/cooperation at the 'closure boundaries' between those groups. This paper argues that, in the 
reformed health sector, with its cascade of principals and agents, output based contracts and contestable 
contracting, the historic form of analysis is adequate. A different form of analysis is needed to explore the new 
changing relationships both within and between the health occupational groups themselves; and secondly and 
perhaps more importantly, to analyse the changing relationships between the health industry occupations and 
the State. 
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The recent release of the "Report of the Ministerial 
Taskforce on Nursing: Releasing the potential of nursing" 
provides a useful point of reference to begin to analyse again 
the changing division oflabour in the production of health 
and sickness services in New Zealand- particularly as this 
report has been produced following a period of significant 
reform. Sociological inquiry into the relationships between 
the various occupational groups engaged in the provision 
of health services has, in the past, tended to focus on the 
professionalising projects of the respective occupations and 
on the contestation/co-operation at the 'closure boundaries' 
between those groups. This type of analysis was appropri-
ate at a time when the occupational groups in the health 
sector had a significant degree of 'autonomy' in determin-
ing the outcomes of their labour and the division of that 
labour. 
This paper argues that, in the reformed health sector, with 
its cascade of principals and agents, output based contracts 
and contestable contracting, the historic form of analysis 
alone is inadequate. A different form of analysis is needed 
to explore the new and changing relationships both within 
and between the health occupational groups themselves. 
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, it· is needed to 
analyse the changing relationships between the health in-
dustry occupations and the State (and its agents) as the prime 
principal, major funder, employer and regulator of work-
ers in the health and sickness industry. Using the Nursing 
Taskforce as a focus, this paper analyses the developments 
to date and speculates on the future as the state seeks to re-
regulate the labour of the health occupations. 
This paper examines what potentially might be a signifi-
cant development in the regulation of the division of la-
bour and of the labour process in the production of health 
and sickness services in New Zealand. That development 
is the direct intervention by the State, as it combines sev-
eral of its roles in the health and sickness sector. These 
roles include its role as legislator and regulator, and sec-
ondly the Government's role as the primary funder of health 
and sickness services. Thirdly it includes the Government's 
role as a significant owner of health and sickness service 
providers in the form of Hospital and Health Services. Pub-
lic and private hospitals together are New Zealand's larg-
est industry and the dominant means of delivering health 
and sickness services, and accounted for approximately 
$4.03 billion dollars of public and private spending in 1996/ 
97 (Devlin & O'Dea, 1998). A significant majority of that 
was spent in state owned hospitals and related services. 
Finally it is in the Government's role as the prime principal 
in a chain of principals and agents, contracting and sub-
contracting one with another over the funding and provi-
sion of health and sickness services, that makes this postu-
lated new form of intervention and regulation most inter-
esting. 
The health reforms that were initiated in 1991 were intended 
to introduce two key elements into the health and sickness 
industry; competition in both the funding and provision of 
health and sickness services and secondly the application 
of agency theory to the organisation of those services. The 
competition element was to be introduced by the separat-
ing the funders and providers and by having the providers 
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competitively tender with the funders to provide predeter-
mined contractual outcomes for a set price (Ashton, 1999; 
Bumett & Malcolm, 1997; Easton, 1997; Imershein & Estes, 
1996; Upton, 1991). The application of agency theory was 
to be implemented by having each player in the industry 
relating to each other at arm 's length through the mecha-
nism of contracts between a principal (usually a funder) 
and an agent (usually a provider) acting on behalf of the 
principal in undertaking to provide clearly defined outcomes 
with clear accountability for those outcomes. That the out-
come of the health reforms have not equalled the inten-
tions is undisputed by all but a very few, the relative suc-
cess or otherwise is a matter of debate and the issues have 
been canvassed widely (see for instance Ashton, 1999; 
Devlin & O'Dea, 1998; Easton, 1997; Fougere, 1994; 
Fougere, 1997). It is not intended in this paper to canvass 
all of these matters again but to concentrate on two related 
aspects that have affected the progress and outcomes of the 
health reforms: the division oflabour and the control of the 
labour process in the production of health and sickness serv-
ices as they relate to agency and contract. 
Health workers can be generally divided into five broad 
groups: 
The licensed 'health professionals ', that group of occu-
pations whose members are subject to state regulation. 
These groups of workers are usually directly involved 
in various research, diagnostic, therapeutic and health 
maintenance tasks. 
Associated with this first group are a diverse number of 
auxiliary workers who assist the health professionals 
in some of the primary groups' activities and who are 
sometimes involved in contestations with their superi-
ors over both the horizontal and lateral divisions of la-
bour within the occupational groups' traditional orbit 
(Pye, 1998). 
The other three groups are the managerial and adminis-
trative workers, either generic or health industry spe-
cific, the hotel domestic, catering and support services 
workers, and what might be broadly defined as trades, 
technical and scientific workers. 
The particular contribution that each of these groups make 
to the workforce in any particular health and sickness serv-
ice production fac ility is dependent on a number of factors. 
For instance: 
the ownership of the facility, either state or private 
its legal form, pannership, company or trust 
whether it is, or is not, for profit 
the particular managerial form adopted: management 
by clinicians, generic general management, or new pub-
lic sector managerialism 
clearly the size of the organisation, the type and com-
plexity of the production tasks being undertaken includ-
ing whether or not it is a teaching as well as clinical 
institution (For a useful discussion of many of these 
factors see Heydebrand, 1973) 
the size of the institutions' staffing budget relative to 
the factors mentioned above has a major impact on the 
rigidity of the demarcations between different occupa-
tional groups 
A particularly interesting factor given the twenty four hour 
a day seven day a week nature of much of the industry, 
especially hospitals, is how the time of the day and the day 
of the week affects the rigidity of the task boundaries. 
During the late afternoon and night and at the weekends 
there is one occupational group - nurses, whose bounda-
ries stretch quite markedly to cover the tasks of those groups 
of workers who tend to have more traditional hours of work 
(Pye, 1998). (The author, in a previous incarnation as a 
nurse who has been on far too many night duties, clearly 
recollects having to undenake tasks that were normally the 
responsibility of; electricians, doctors, plumbers, physi-
otherapists, fitters, chaplains, orderlies, morticians, cooks, 
psychologists, carpenters, lab technicians, painters, occu-
pational therapists and accountants. This is not an exhaus-
tive list and could no doubt be added to by any nurse who 
has done their share of night duty in any reasonably sized 
hospital. ) 
While the organisational factors affecting the division of 
labour are of importance in the analysis of local variations 
and to an understanding of the conflicts and compromises 
around the occupational boundaries that occur at the im-
mediate point of production, they have to be seen in the 
context of a wider and much deeper division of labour that 
exists panicularly between the occupational groups and 
subgroups of the health professions. 
The licensed ' health professions ' are the core occupational 
groups of the health and sickness industry. It is their regu-
lated, monopolistic/oligopolistic position of having con-
trol over the actual production of the industry's primary 
outputs, the myriad diagnostic and therapeutic activities 
that are currently available to achieve some change in the 
psycho-social and physiological state of an individual or 
group, that makes them core. It is the issues around the 
di vision of labour and of the control of the labour process 
of these groups that are primary determinants of efficiency 
and effectiveness in the health and sickness industry. As a 
consequence, governments, policy makers and managers 
of the health and sickness industry have always had an in-
terest in how the division of labour amongst these groups 
has occurred and how the health and sickness labour proc-
ess has been organised. In a survey of health sector human 
resource managers and industrial relations practitioners re-
poned at an earlier LEW conference (Pye & Cullinane, 
1997) a number of the respondents identified the division 
of labour between the 'health professionals' as one of the 
key management issues in the post reform period. The cur-
rent Minister of Health has also made comments which 
indicate a more than passing interest in changing the cur-
rent division of labour (NZ Government, 1997a; NZ Gov-
ernment, 1997b). The key difference in that interest and 
any outcomes that could arise from such interest in the pre· 
and post·reform era is: who were then, and who are now, 
the key managers and policy makers? 
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For most of the period up until the late 1980's, at almost all 
levels of the institutions inVolved in the health and sick-
ness industry from the Department of Health down to the 
smallest public health clinic, the managers and policy mak-
ers were members of the 'health professions ' ; invariably 
doctors and nurses. These doctors and nurses were two anns 
of a triumvirate management structure with a senior non-
medical public servant, board secretary or hospital man-
ager as the third part of that structure. The spheres of influ-
ence and areas of managerial control of each were jeal-
ously guarded; in particular the clinical divisions of labour 
were the sole domain of the health professionals. At both 
the institutional and central policy making levels, decisions 
about the division of health and sickness service labour 
were made directly by those who were intimately and pro-
fess ionally involved in and affected by the outcomes of 
those decisions. This power and influence over the divi-
sion oflabour was matched, to large degree, with the power 
the 'health professions' had in determining what would be 
the outputs and outcomes of the health and sickness serv-
ice production process. These influences were reinforced 
by the lack of direct contractual accountability back to the 
funders, primarily the state. Those who paid the piper did 
not necessarily call the tune. The managerial and policy 
making power of the health professional elites was further 
enhanced by the public prestige and high standing with 
which the 'medical professions' were held by the public. 
As a result the contestations over which occupational group 
would undertake which tasks in the complex division of 
health and sickness labour tended to occur within and be-
tween the various occupations with (for the most part) the 
public and politicians becoming aware of the outcomes af-
ter the fact. Very few of the contestations occurred in the 
public arena and then only when one or other side in the 
contest sought to gain public sympathy and support for their 
particular position. Two of the more notable of these were 
the dispute over midwifery in the early part of the century 
(Papps & Olssen, 1997; Parkes, 1991 ) or the struggle be-
tween doctors and the first Labour Government (both of 
which the doctors won) (Lovell-Smith, 1966). A second 
and more important consequence of the health professions 
holding key managerial and policy positions was that the 
degree and scope of statutory regulation that impacted on 
the health and sickness service division of labour was very 
much influenced by the health professions and to large de-
gree reflected the outcomes of the contestation b~tween 
and within themselves. The statutory regulation covered a 
number of areas, the tlrree most important of those being 
covered by the Acts of Parliament relating to: the registra-
tion and licensing of health workers; the provision of sta[e 
subsidies and funding; and Acts that restricted certain ac-
tivities to particular occupational groups. 
The Acts that provided for registration or licensing of the 
various occupational groups were generally concerned with 
matters such as establishing the criteria for the educational 
qualifications necessary to gain entry into the profession 
and having gained entry, the subsequent behaviour of the 
practitioner. They frequently included provision for the ex-
clusive use of certain titles by members of the occupational 
groups, reinforcing their position of difference. Where there 
were different classes or levels of practitioners within an 
occupation the Acts clearly established the hierarchical 
position, duties and responsibilities of each class relative 
to each other and, in some cases, relative to other com-
pletely separate occupational groups eg. Enrolled Nurses 
to Medical Practitioners. While these Acts rarely made spe-
cific reference, in a detenninistic sense, to a particular set 
of tasks or activities that the relevant occupational group 
might do or might not do, they did establish boards or coun-
cils whose membership to a large extent reflected the mana-
gerial and policy elites discussed above. A consequence of 
this was that the administration of those Acts by these statu-
tory boards and councils reflected and reinforced the divi-
sion of labour that had been established in earlier contesta-
tions and that existed at the point of production. 
Of greater significance to the determination and mainte-
nance of the health and sickness services division of la-
bour are those Acts and Regulations that specifically limit 
certain activities to a particular occupational group or frac-
tion of that group. Some examples are legislation such as 
the Medicines Act and the Controlled Drugs Regulations 
which expressly limit the prescribing of a very long list of 
therapeutic substances to particular occupational groups 
and, in some cases, to particular classes within those occu-
pational groups. Legislated monopoly access to the pre-
scription and use of these therapeutic substances creates a 
very strong occupational boundary for the groups that have 
that monopoly against other groups in the industry. Of equal 
significance are those legislative and regulatory provisions 
about which practitioners, in any particular occupational 
group, can initiate access to state subsidy and/or referral to 
state subsidised practitioners or institutions. Examples are 
the Social Security and Accident Compensation legislation 
which gave almost complete monopoly access to a range 
of subsidies for primary medical care, laboratory and ra-
diological tests, and to medications. M_onopoly referral 
rights to subsidised therapeutic procedures such as physi-
otherapy, chiropody etc. or onto secondary public hospital 
care, provided another near absolute boundary in the divi-
sion of health and sickness service labour. In the post re-
form era, it is in these !alter two areas that government is 
exerting its power and influence as legislator to re-regulate 
the health and sickness service division of labour to meet 
its goals as the prime principal/agent and funder in the health 
and sickness service industry. 
The first major change that affected the control of the divi-
sion of labour and labour process in the production of health 
and sickness services during the health reforms was the 
restructuring of the industry's management structures and 
processes particularly in the public hospital sector. These 
changes started with amendments to both the Area Health 
Boards Act and State Sector Act in 1988. These amend-
ments set aside a tradition of hospita1 and related organisa-
tional administration in which the health professions domi-
nated the management of the health industry (as discussed 
above). These acts introduced concepts of generic general 
management with the appointing of managers who were 
not necessarily health professionals. The amendments also 
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provided for the Chief Executive Officer of an Area Health 
Board to become the employer of all staff employed by the 
boards, removing the previous multiple sets of 
accountabilities and channels of communication that had 
allowed the various health professions to exert influence at 
different levels depending on the circumstances. The sec· 
and major change was the dismissal of the Area Health 
Boards by Simon Upton which removed the health profes· 
sionals and their sympathisers who were members of those 
boards from positions where they could directly influence 
staffing policy at the point of production. The new manag· 
ers and the CommissionerS which replaced the boards were 
operating under a new (for the health industry) set of im· 
peratives with respect to the utilisation of the human re· 
sources they employed, in particular the health profession-
als (Pye & Cullinane, 1997). Similar changes occurred in 
the Department of Health as health professionals employed 
within the department in senior managerial and policy po· 
sitions lost power and influence during the restructuring of 
the department and the introduction of general manage-
ment. Despite the possibilities for changing the health and 
sickness division of labour presented by these legislative 
changes, until recently, only one major change of national 
importance occurred. 
This was the change to the status of midwives, who were 
given the opportunity to become independent practitioners 
with limited rights to prescribe, access to subsidies, rights 
of referral to public hospitals and access to laboratory tests 
etc. This in effect put them on a par with general practi-
tioners in the maternity and childbirth segment of the health 
and sickness industry. While this change did not occur as a 
result of government initiated process, it was facilitated by 
the changes that were occurring during the reform period. 
The events that led to the changes for midwives were an 
example of the inter-professional contestation discussed 
above. It was a reversal of the process that had occurred in 
the early part of the century (discussed above), in which 
the midwives, in co-operation with well organised lobby 
groups in society and with the assistance of a sympathetic 
Minister of Health, convinced the government of the day 
to change the legislation. One of the consequences for the 
Government was that it was able to introduce competition 
into this segment of the health and sickness industry as a 
result of the increased number of potential agents with 
whom it could contract for the provision of maternity serv-
ices. (One of the unintended consequences was that large 
numbers of general practitioners have exited this segment 
of the market for 'economic reasons' and given there are 
only slightly in excess of 250 midwives in any form of 
independent practice, choice and competition has, in fact, 
diminished in many parts of New Zealand) (Health, 1998). 
The relative success of this re-regulation of the division of 
labour has provided an example of how the Government , 
might also re-regulate the division of labour in other sec-
tors of the health and sickness market. In a marketised sys-
tem of health and sickness care production, which is or-
ganised through a cascade of agents and principals, it is to 
the advantage of the Government, as the prime principal, 
and to its principal agents (the Health Funding Authority 
and the ACC) to have the maximum number of potential 
agents available to contract with. It is equally advantageous 
to other agents, the healthcare providers, many of whom 
are also owned by the State, for them to have a large number 
of agents and sub-agents (including employees) with whom 
they can contract and sub·contract with for specific sets of 
outputs. 
One of the factors that has contributed to the success and! 
or failure of the health reforms has been the limitations on 
the number of available agents in particular areas with 
whom the State and its agents could contract. A significant 
limitation has been the fact that a number of the key pro-
ductive activities can only be undertaken by members of 
the occupational groups which have legislative monopoly 
powers over the perfonnance of those tasks. This has re-
stricted the ability of policy makers and managers to max-
imise the utilisation of the human resources available in 
the production of the contracted outcomes. There are a 
number of ways in which this can be addressed. One is to 
increase the absolute number of people in the occupations 
who hold the monopoly power. This course is expensive, 
time consuming and has a long lead-time before it can have 
significant effect. A second course of action is to reduce 
the monopoly power by giving other workers in the sector 
access to those particular tasks. The Taskforce on Nursing 
appears to give a clear indication that the Government in-
tends to proceed down the second of these courses using a 
consultative process rather than by executive fiat (at least 
in this instance). 
The last set of published comprehensive data relating to 
1994 (Health, 1996) indicated there were 61570 persons 
licensed as members of one of the thirteen regulated occu-
pational groups in the health and sickness sector. Of these 
46539 (75%) were nurses of all levels. There were 7180 
(11.7%) doctors of all levels. Of all of the occupational 
groups, only two (nursing and medicine) can be said to 
have a generalist orientation, at least during the initial train· 
ing and period of practice. All of the other groups tend to 
have a very specific focus on a set of pathologies, particu-
lar organ systems and specific therapeutic modalities. 
Where nursing has specialised its area of practice, these 
specialisms have tended to reflect and generally comple-
ment the specialisms of medicine - for example care of the 
aged and intensive care. Nursing, therefore, provides an 
excellent source of alternative workers (particularly to doc-
tors) in a number of important areas of the health and sick-
ness industry, but only if the regulatory frameworks and 
other barriers which prevent nurses from undertaking a 
number of tasks currently restricted to doctors are removed 
or modified. The clear intention of the Nursing Taskforce 
was to identify these barriers and suggest ways they could 
be removed. 
It is beyond the brief of this paper to discuss the process 
and recommendation of the Taskforce. What is of particu-
lar importance is that the Taskforce was initiated by the 
Minister of Health; it was funded and materially supported 
by the Ministry with the clear intention of providing the 
Minister of Health with recommendations about the re-regu-
lation of the division of labour in the health and sickness 
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industry. No other occupational groups were represented 
on the Taskforce, though they were consulted. The 
Taskforce was initially chaired by an ex-member of Parlia-
ment who left to take up a diplomatic position, and who 
was subsequently replaced as chair by the only other non-
nurse member, a health economist. There was one member 
whose tribal affiliation is mentioned and there were no 
males. All of the participants had position titles that indi-
cated that they were in senior managerial, clinical, educa-
tional and/or policy positions. The Taskforce met without 
public or academic scrutiny and submissions were only 
sought by invitation (the invitations were widely distrib-
uted amongst nurses who were members of the Nurses Or-
ganisation through its journal). Broadly, the findings indi-
cated that with some change to regulations, selected and 
appropriately trained nurses would be able to undertake a 
number of the tasks currently undertaken by doctors in a 
limited number of discrete areas of practice. The members 
of the Taskforce generally supported the proposed changes 
although there were some dissenting voices relating to the 
composition of the Nursing Council and to employment 
related matters. Naturally there was not such a positive re-
sponse from doctors to the findings of the Taskforce. The 
Taskforce has subsequently been disbanded and features 
of its report are being investigated and actioned by the 
Ministry of Health. 
Conclusion 
The key conclusion that might be drawn from the Nursing 
Taskforce experience is that the Government sees itself, at 
least at this point in time, as having a central role in decid-
ing the boundaries in the health and sickness division of 
labour, and the organisation of the associated labour proc-
ess. The Government is taking upon itself a role that was 
previously left almost entirely to the health professions 
themselves. The Government is able to do this, firstly be-
cause it is, at the same time, the regulator, in many cases 
the employer, the principal funder and the primary princi-
pal in the health and sickness care industry. Secondly given 
the relative loss of influence and power of the health pro-
fessions at the managerial and policy making levels in the 
industry, the Government is now able to exercise its power 
as a regulator to shape the agenda about the health and sick-
ness division of labour for its own purposes. 
Future research 
Some of the questions that arise for researchers are: 
What impact will the changes in the regulation of the 
division of labour actually have on the composition and 
distribution of the health and sickness industry 
workforce? (There are already legislative changes be-
ing made with respect to the prescription of medicines) 
Was the Nursing Taskforce and its consequences a one 
off opportunistic event, or does it signal an intention by 
the Government to further actively intervene in the 
health and sickness division of labour (given that occu-
pational regulation has been on the Government' s 
agenda for some time)? 
What impact will these changes have on the relation-
ships between the occupational groups at all levels, at 
the point of production and at the elite levels? One of 
the nursing elites, the Nurses Organisation, has already 
responded with a document 'Building Partnerships: De-
veloping the Future of Nursing' (NZNO, 1998) which 
makes some clear assertions about boundaries and re-
lationships. 
What are the potential impacts on employment and in-
dustrial relations in the health and sickness industry? 
How will the analysis and understanding of these 
changes in the processes of occupational regulation ar-
ticulate with other modes of analysis eg. gender and 
class, that are applied to an understanding of health and 
sickness workers? 
Given the centrality of the organisation and control of the 
division of labour to success or failure in the health and 
sickness industry, these and related questions require greater 
attention than they currently receive. 
References 
Ashton, T. (1999) The Health Reforms: To Market and 
Back? In T.Ashton, P. Dalziel, &J. Boston (eds), 
Redesigning the New Zealand Welfare State. 
Auckland: Oxford University Press. 
Burnett, P. & Malcolm, L. (1997) Beyond Ideology: the 
emerging roles of New Zealand's Crown Health 
enterprises, International Journal of Health Sen~­
ices, 27(1), 89-108. 
Devlin, N. & O'Dea, D. (1998) Hospitals. In A. Bollard & 
M. Pickford ( eds ), The Structure and Dynamics 
of New Zealand Industries. Palmerston North: 
Dunmore Press. 
Easton, B. (1997). The health reforms, The Commerciali-
sation of New Zealand.Auck.land:Auckland Uni-
versity Press. 
Fougere, G. (1994) The State and Health-Care Reform. In 
A. Sharp (ed.), Leap Into The Dark: The chang-
ing role of the state in New Zealand since 1984 
(pp. 107-124). Auckland: Auckland University 
Press. 
Fougere, G. (1997). Transforming Health Sectors: New 
Logics of Organising in the New Zealand Health 
Sector. Paper resented at the Postcards From the 
End of the Millennium: November 28-30, 
SAANZ, Massey University, Albany. 
Government, NZ. (I997a) English to Nurses' Conference; 
Transcript. New Zealand Government. 
Government, NZ. (1997b) Health Minister- Opportuni-
ties for Nurses. New Zealand Government. 
Heydebrand, W. (1973) Hospital Bureaucracy: A com-
parative study of organizations. New York: 
Dunellen. 
Imersbein,A.W. & Estes, C.L. (1996) From Health Serv-
Labour; Employment and Work in New Zealand 1998 129 
130 
ices to Medical Markets: The commodity trans-
formation of medical production and the non profit 
sector. International Journal of Health Services, 
26(2), 221-238. 
Loveli~Smith, J.B. (1966) The New Zealand Doctor and 
the Welfare State. Auckland: Blackwood & Janet 
Paul. 
N.Z. Ministry of Health, (1996) New Zealand health 
Workforce. Wellington: New Zealand Health In-
formation Service. 
N.Z. Ministry of Health, ( 1998) The 1997 Nursing 
Workforce Survey : Unpublished. 
NZNO (1998) Building Partnerships: Developing the Fu-
ture of Nursirlg. Wellington. NZ Nurses Organi-
sation. 
Papps, E. & Olssen, M. ( 1997) Doctoring childbirth and 
regulating midwifery in New Zealand: a 
Foucauldian perspective. Palmerston North: 
Dunmore Press. 
Parkes, C. ( 1991) The Impact of the Medicalisation of New 
Zealand's Maternity Services on Women's Expe-
rience of Childbirth. In L. Bryder (ed.), A Healthy 
Country: Essays on the Social History of Medi-
cine in New Zealand. Wellington: Bridget 
Williams Books. (pp. 165- 180) 
Pye, M. (1998) Some Contradictions in the Current De-
bates on Nursing's Place in the Division of Health 
and Sickness Care Labour. New Zealand Journal 
of Industrial Relations, 23(3), 181- 190. 
Pye, M. & Cullinane, J. ( 1997) Employment Relations in 
the New Zealand Health Sector: A Survey. In 
Morrison P.S. Labour, Employment and Work in 
New Zealand. Proceedings of the Seventh Con-
ference 227-231. 
Upton, S. (1991) Your Health & Public Health: A State-
ment of Government Health Policy. Wellington: 
Minister of Health. 
Author 
Michael Pye is a PhD student at the 
Department of Strategic Management and Leadership, 
University of Waikato, 
Private Bag 3015, 
Hamilton. 
E-mail: mjp@clear.net.nz 
Labour. Employment and Work in New Zealand 1998 
